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Giving Joseph Hearings Their Due:  
How to Ensure that Joseph Hearings 
Pass Due Process Muster  
Amy Greer* 
If there is no reasonable basis for treating these confined 
noncitizens worse than ordinary defendants charged with 
crimes; worse than convicted criminals appealing their 
convictions; worse than civilly committed citizens; worse 
than identical noncitizens found elsewhere within the 
United States; and worse than noncitizens who have 
committed crimes, served their sentences, and been 
definitively ordered removed (but lack a country willing to 
take them), their detention without bail is arbitrary.  Thus, 
the constitutional language, purposes, and tradition that 
require bail in instances of criminal confinement also very 
likely require bail in these instances of civil confinement. 
That perhaps is why Blackstone wrote that the law provides 
for the possibility of “bail in any case whatsoever.”1  
* Assistant Public Defender, Alaska Public Defender Agency.  J.D.,
Roger Williams University School of Law, 2020; Ph.D. and M.S., Simmons 
University; M.A. University of Pittsburgh; B.A. Wheaton College (MA).  I 
would like to thank Professor Peter Margulies for his guidance and support, 
along with my family and friends for cheering me on. 
1. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 865–66 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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INTRODUCTION 
To comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution,2 individuals alleged 
to have been convicted of crimes included in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)3 
must be provided a constitutionally adequate opportunity to 
challenge their inclusion in that category because without such an 
opportunity the individuals face prolonged mandatory detention 
with no right to a bond hearing.4  As Justice Souter noted, 
“detaining an alien requires more than the rationality of a general 
detention statute; any justification must go to the alien himself.”5  
Such is the purpose of the Joseph hearing.6  However, the current 
Joseph hearing is inadequate to protect the individual liberty of 
noncitizens because it incorrectly places a nearly nonexistent 
burden on the government and a virtually “insurmountable” burden 
on the noncitizen.7  Such an imbalance significantly increases the 
likelihood of individuals being erroneously deprived of their rights 
when “additional procedural safeguards” have “probable value” in 
preventing such occurrences.8  
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court wrote “that the 
Constitution may well preclude granting ‘an administrative body 
the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating 
fundamental rights.’”9  The Court went on to say that plenary power 
“is subject to important constitutional limitations” and “Congress 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  “No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”  Id. 
3. To be consistent with relevant case law, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is used in
lieu of I.N.A. section 236(c). 
4. Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. (Gayle III), No. 12-2806 (FLW), 2019
WL 4165310, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2019) (“Justice Kennedy noted that since 
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is ‘premised upon the alien’s 
deportability,’ due process requires ‘individualized procedures’ such as a 
Joseph hearing to ensure that the alien is in fact deportable.” (quoting Demore 
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531–532 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
5. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 552 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 514 n.3.
7. See Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *18; see also Tijani v. Willis, 430
F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring).
8. Gayle v. Johnson (Gayle II), 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 391 (D.N.J. 2015).
9. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001) (quoting Superintendent,
Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985)). 
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must choose ‘a constitutionally permissible means of implementing’ 
that power.”10  However, in Demore v. Kim, the Court held that § 
1226(c) was facially constitutional despite authorizing the Attorney 
General and his agents to detain an individual without a hearing 
and without judicial review for an unspecified duration.11  The 
subsequent cases of Jennings v. Rodriguez and Nielsen v. Preap 
include dicta that Kim is still good law as part of the statutory 
analysis, but instead focus on the ways in which district and circuit 
courts are interpreting that analysis.12  Because of the current 
precedent regarding § 1226(c), the Joseph hearing has become 
essential; indeed, it is nearly the only procedural mechanism a 
detained person has to challenge his inclusion under the mandatory 
detention statute.  
This Article asserts that the Joseph hearing must require the 
government to show probable cause to include the respondent in the 
mandatory detention category.13  If the government meets its 
burden, the respondent, then, must show a substantial argument 
as to why he should not be included in the mandatory detention 
category.  Such a standard comports with the Fifth Amendment 
because it provides more adequate due process protections to 
noncitizens facing potentially lengthy detention periods, while also 
“giv[ing] considerable weight to any special governmental interest 
in detention.”14 
To support the above proposal, this Article will examine and 
compare the decisions of Gayle v. Warden Monmouth County,15 and 
its predecessor Gayle v. Johnson,16 with Tijani v. Willis17 to propose 
a new Joseph hearing standard that passes constitutional muster. 
Part I of this Article outlines the history of § 1226(c), the judicial 
interpretation of § 1226(c), and the most common concerns about 
§ 1226(c).  Part II of this Article explains the Joseph hearing and
10. Id. at 695 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 941–42 (1983)).
11. See Kim, 538 U.S. at 523.
12. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 830 (2018); Nielsen v. Preap,
139 S. Ct. 954, 962 (2019). 
13. See infra Part III.
14. Kim, 538 U.S. at 578 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. Gayle III, No. 12-2806 (FLW), 2019 WL 4165310, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 3,
2019). 
16. Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371 (D.N.J. 2015).
17. Tijani, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005).
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outlines the two aforementioned approaches to the Joseph hearing. 
Finally, Part III proposes a new standard for the Joseph hearing.  
I. THE WHAT AND WHY OF § 1226(C)
In 1996, Congress overhauled the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).  Under IIRIRA, Congress 
mandated the detention of all immigrants and nonimmigrants 
placed in removal proceedings because of a criminal conviction or 
national security concerns.18  Section 1226(c) of the statute states: 
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien 
who— 
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any
offense covered in § 1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense
covered in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this
title,
(C) is deportable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the
basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence
[sic] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
(D) is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or
deportable under § 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the 
alien is released on parole, supervised release, or 
probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be 
arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.19 
Under this statute, the Attorney General is required to detain 
lawful permanent residents “without a hearing.”20  Additionally, 
the statute “eliminated the possibility of bail [even] in the case of a 
18. See M. Isabel Medina, Demore v. Kim—A Dance of Power and Human
Rights, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 697, 700 (2004).  For a full discussion about the 
history of § 1226(c), see id.  See also Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: 
The Need for Procedural Reform in “Joseph” Hearings After Demore v. Kim, 31 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51 (2006); Alina Das, Immigration Detention: 
Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 
(2013). 
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2018).
20. Medina, supra note 18, at 700.
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person who did not pose a flight risk and was not a danger to the 
community.”21  
Through § 1226(c), Congress sought “(1) to protect the public 
from potentially dangerous criminal aliens; (2) to prevent aliens 
from absconding during removal procedures; (3) to correct former 
bond procedures under which over twenty percent of criminal aliens 
absconded before their deportation hearings; and (4) to restore 
public faith in the immigration system.”22  In both Kim and Preap, 
the majority opinions averred that Congress “adopted [§ 1226(c)] 
against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with 
increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens,”23 and that “[o]nce 
released, more than 20% of deportable criminal aliens failed to 
appear for their removal hearings.”24  Because of these factors, 
Congress decided that allowing the person to apply for bond or 
parole was “too risky.”25  As Justice Kennedy posited, “[i]t seems 
evident a criminal record accumulated by an admitted alien during 
his or her time in the United States is likely to be a better indicator 
of risk than factors relied upon during the [Attorney General]’s 
initial decision to admit or exclude.”26 
Judges and scholars, however, have questioned both the 
accuracy and reliability of the statistics Congress and the Court 
used to justify the enactment of § 1226(c).27  For example, 
“[s]cholars question whether there was in fact a significant 
percentage of removable aliens who actually appeared before an 
Immigration Judge [(IJ)] for a bond hearing that then failed to 
return for their remaining proceedings.”28  Additionally, Congress 
and the Court gave little credence to the resource-related issues 
21. Id.
22. Gayle III, No. 12-2806 (FLW), 2019 WL 4165310, at *16 (D.N.J. Sept.
3, 2019). 
23. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003); Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct.
954, 960 (2019) (explaining that § 1226(c) “sprang from a ‘concer[n] that 
deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime 
and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers.’”). 
24. Kim, 538 U.S. at 519.
25. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 959.
26. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 714 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
27. See Gayle v. Johnson (Gayle I), 4 F. Supp. 3d 692, 709–10 n.25 (D.N.J.
2014). 
28. Id. at 710 n.25.
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that drove INS decisions, such as inadequate funding, bed space, 
lack of notice to those in removal proceedings, and heavy 
caseloads.29  In so doing, “[t]he nonappearance statistics—which 
did not clearly distinguish between noncitizens never detained by 
INS, noncitizens released by INS on a low bond, or noncitizens 
released by an [IJ] after a bond hearing—reveal little if anything 
about the effectiveness of bond hearings.”30  The result of these 
issues is that Congress required that the Attorney General detain 
an entire category of people without any individual consideration 
as to whether they should be included in this category, or whether 
they are dangerous, or a flight risk. 
A. Judicial Interpretations of § 1226(c)
Section 1226(c) has been specifically at issue in three United
States Supreme Court cases: Demore v. Kim,31 Jennings v. 
Rodriguez,32 and, most recently, Nielsen v. Preap.33  In Kim, the 
Court upheld § 1226(c) as facially constitutional.34  In contrast, 
Rodriguez and Preap do not reach the constitutional issues and 
specifically state that the statute’s constitutionality may be 
contested in as-applied challenges.35  
In 2003, the Kim Court held “that Congress, justifiably 
concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained 
continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal 
hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such as 
respondent may be detained for the brief period necessary for their 
29. Das, supra note 18, at 149–55; see also Kim, 538 U.S. at 519.
30. Das, supra note 18, at 152.
31. See 538 U.S. at 552.
32. See 138 S. Ct.  830, 865–66 (2018).
33. See 139 S. Ct. 954, 954 (2019).
34. Kim, 538 U.S. at 531 (stating that “[d]etention during removal
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”). 
35. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851 (noting that it did not “reach those
[constitutional] arguments” made by respondents, but “remand[ed] the case to 
the Court of Appeals to consider them in the first instance.”); Preap, 139 S. Ct. 
at 972 (“While respondents might have raised a head-on constitutional 
challenge to § 1226(c), they did not.  Our decision today on the meaning of that 
statutory provision does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, 
constitutional challenges to applications of the statute as we have now read 
it.”). 
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removal proceedings.”36  The Court reasoned that “deportation 
proceedings ‘would be in vain if those accused could not be held in 
custody pending the inquiry into their true character.’”37  Further, 
the detention periods “last[] roughly a month and a half in the vast 
majority of cases in which it is invoked,”38 and thus, “in the majority 
of cases [the detention] lasts for less than the [ninety] days we 
considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas.”39  Under this 
presumption that detention under § 1226(c) would last only a short 
period, the Kim Court upheld the statute as constitutional.40 
Nearly fifteen years later, the Rodriguez Court determined 
that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in its application 
of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to § 1226(c) because it 
had read the statute to require a bond hearing when a person is 
detained for six months or longer.41  Supreme Court Justice Alito 
objurgated the appeals court—“a court relying on [the 
constitutional avoidance] canon . . . must interpret the statute, not 
rewrite it.”42  Therefore, the Court, in reviewing the statutory 
construction of § 1226(c), determined that the statute “does not give 
detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the 
course of their detention.”43  The Court remanded the case back to 
the Ninth Circuit, which in turn remanded to the district court, to 
determine whether § 1226(c) comports with due process.44 
One year later, in Nielsen v. Preap, the Court held that the 
statutory construction of § 1226(c) clearly indicates that all 
36. Kim, 538 U.S. at 513.
37. Id. at 523 (quoting Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235
(1896)). 
38. Id. at 530.
39. Id. at 529.  Zadvydas held that under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), an
immigrant ordered removed, if held for six months or more, may “provide[ ] 
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future.”  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 678, 701 (2001).  
The government must counter with evidence that detention remains 
reasonable.  See id.  If it cannot do so, the detained person may be released 
under supervision provided they can demonstrate they are not a danger to the 
community or a flight risk.  See id. at 683. 
40. Kim, 538 U.S. at 516.
41. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 852.
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individuals who have been convicted of crimes outlined in § 1226(c) 
may be detained, regardless of when they were released from prison 
or jail for their predicate criminal conviction.45  In deciding this 
case, the Court reiterated that: 
[F]rom Congress’s perspective . . . it is irrelevant that the
[Attorney General] could go on detaining criminal aliens
subject to a bond hearing.  Congress enacted mandatory
detention precisely out of concern that such individualized
hearings could not be trusted to reveal which ‘deportable
criminal aliens who are not detained’ might ‘continue to
engage in crime [or] fail to appear for their removal
hearings.’46
This decision, again, took aim at the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance should be applied to the 
words “when released” in the last paragraph of § 1226(c).  When it 
applies those two words, it “limit[s] the class of aliens subject to 
mandatory detention.”47  In contrast, the Court determined that 
“when released” simply “specif[ies] the timing of arrest . . . only for 
the vast majority of cases: those involving criminal aliens who were 
once in criminal custody,” and not the literal reading the Ninth 
Circuit had conducted.48  However, the Preap majority emphasized 
that the respondents did not raise a “head-on constitutional 
challenge to § 1226(c),” thus the Court’s decision “on the meaning 
of that statutory provision does not foreclose as-applied 
challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications of the 
statute as we have now read it.”49 
Each of the aforementioned Supreme Court cases were five-
four decisions.50  Across the three cases, the dissenting voices 
primarily asked: “Why would Congress have granted the [Attorney 
General] such broad authority to deny bail hearings, especially 
when doing so would run contrary to basic American and common-
45. Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 971 (2019).
46. Id. at 968 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003)).
47. Id. at 971.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 972.
50. See generally Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954; Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.
830 (2018); Kim, 538 U.S. 510. 
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law traditions?”51  The critique by the dissenters was that the Court 
has repeatedly held that Congress did, in fact, issue a mandate 
requiring the Attorney General to detain individuals within the 
category covered by § 1226(c), forbidding bail and a bail hearing for 
those so included.52  The dissenters argued that these decisions 
contravened prior decisions when the Court had grappled with 
identifying a reasonable detention period before a bond hearing is 
required.53  In the majority of those cases, the Court determined 
that detention beyond six months was an unreasonable period 
without a bond hearing.54  However, in the cases challenging 
§ 1226(c), “[t]he issue [], of course, [was] not timing but the right to
individualized review at all.”55  Because the statute foreclosed any
discretion on the part of the government to provide an
individualized bond hearing for those properly included under
§ 1226(c), and the Court continuously interpreted the statute in
that manner, the four dissenting Justices argued that “the
majority’s interpretation of the statute would likely render the
statute unconstitutional.”56
B. Concerns About § 1226(c)
Supreme Court Justices, federal appellate judges, federal
district court judges, and scholars have expressed deep concern that 
the Court has read § 1226(c) to be a form of nonpunitive, civil 
detention,57 while it actually harshly and severely violates the 
rights and liberties of immigrants who fall within the categories 
51. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 978 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 859 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (holding that
§ 1231(a)(6) contained a six-month presumption as to the length of time for
which it was reasonable to detain a person who had been ordered removed);
see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742, 747 (1987) (requiring that
“a judicial officer [] determine whether an arrestee shall be detained,” and that
“[t]he arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing, and the maximum
length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the
Speedy Trial Act.”) (internal citations omitted).
54. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
55. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 555–56 n.11 (2003) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). 
56. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 859 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Kim, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Gayle III, 2019 WL
4165310, at *10. 
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outlined with little recourse.  Judges and scholars alike criticize 
three major aspects of § 1226(c): (1) that it does not allow for an 
individualized bond hearing, (2) that it does not expressly limit the 
length of detention that may be imposed without an individualized 
hearing,58 and (3) that it holds “a concession of deportability [as] a 
functional equivalent to entry of a final order of removal.”59  Each 
critique is discussed below. 
First, the lack of individual hearings is alarming because the 
statute clearly states that the discretion of the Attorney General 
“shall not be subject to review”; therefore, “[n]o court may set aside 
any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section 
regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, 
revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”60  As a result, a person who 
allegedly falls within a category outlined in § 1226(c) may only 
contest his detention by requesting a hearing to challenge his 
inclusion in the category61 or by being detained for a significant 
58. See Gayle III, No. 12-2806 (FLW), 2019 WL 4165310, at *10 (D.N.J.
Sept. 3, 2019); see also Kim, 538 U.S. at 555–56 n.11 (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 978 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Casas-
Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Even 
though [the individual’s] detention is permitted by statute . . . [w]e hold that 
the government may not detain a legal permanent resident . . . for a prolonged 
period without providing him a neutral forum in which to contest the necessity 
of his continued detention.”); Hechavarria v. Sessions, No. 15-CV-1058, 2018 
WL 5776421, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2018) (“Moreover, given that the statute 
precludes any pre- or post-deprivation procedure to challenge the government’s 
assumption that an immigrant is a danger to the community or a flight risk, it 
presents a significant risk of erroneously depriving [the individual] of life and 
liberty interests.”); Darlene C. Goring, Freedom from Detention: The 
Constitutionality of Mandatory Detention for Criminal Aliens Seeking to 
Challenge Grounds for Removal, 69 ARK. L. REV. 911, 925 (2017) (“For this 
cohort of criminal aliens, mandatory detention without bond infringes upon the 
substantive due process protections afforded by the Constitution to be free from 
unreasonable restraint.”). 
59. Bhargava, supra note 18, at 54.
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2018); see, e.g., Quinteros v. Warden Pike Cty, 784
F. App’x 75, 76 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that that the court “lacks jurisdiction to
otherwise review the IJ’s ‘discretionary judgment regarding’ the denial of a
bond under § 1226(c).”).
61. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999) (“[T]he [IJ]may
make a determination on whether a lawful permanent resident ‘is not properly 
included’ in a mandatory detention category . . . when an [IJ] is convinced that 
the Service is substantially unlikely to establish . . . the charge or charges that 
subject the alien to mandatory detention.”). 
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period of time to the extent that he may initiate a successful habeas 
corpus petition.62 
Further, as outlined above, the Court in Kim found that 
Congress enacted § 1226(c) because it perceived “criminal aliens” as 
highly likely to reoffend while awaiting the conclusion of their 
removal hearings and because it was persuaded by data suggesting 
that “criminal aliens” are a high flight risk.63  While the majority 
in Kim held that this rationale was enough to justify a brief 
detention in order to best effectuate removal and prevent crime in 
the community,64 Justice Kennedy remarked that, “the Due Process 
Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty;” thus, “a lawful 
permanent resident alien . . . could be entitled to an individualized 
determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the 
continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.”65  
However, “[t]here is a difference between detention being 
authorized and being necessary as to any particular person.”66  An 
entire cohort of individuals is being detained under the guise of 
“public safety” based on potentially inaccurate and misleading 
data,67 and without any individual consideration.  As Justice 
Rehnquist articulated: “In our society liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception.”68  Section 1226(c) is not a “carefully limited exception,” 
but a categorical suspension of “the [g]overnment’s duty not to 
deprive any ‘person’ of ‘liberty’ without ‘due process of law.’”69 
62. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).  Currently, federal
district courts have been flooded with habeas petitions predicated on due 
process challenges to detention.  See, e.g., Ernst v. Green, No. 19-10189, 2019 
WL 5304072 (KM), at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2019); Kabba v. Barr, 403 F. Supp. 3d 
180, 184, 191 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201, 210 (D. 
Mass. 2019). 
63. See supra Section I.A.
64. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003).
65. See id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir.
2008). 
67. See supra Section I.A.
68. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
69. Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 985 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Darlene C. Goring argued that criminal aliens, subject to prolonged detention: 
[W]ho do not concede removability are not permitted to assert a
challenge to their ultimate removability before they are detained
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Second, the statute does not expressly limit the length of 
detention, but sets forth that a person “may” be detained “pending 
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United 
States.”70 Many judges and scholars argue that the 
constitutionality of § 1226(c), as decided in Kim, was largely 
predicated on the alleged brief period of detention that immigrant 
detainees would experience, as so carefully discussed in 
Zadvydas.71  Fifteen years after Kim, Justice Breyer pointed out 
that: 
Detention normally lasts twice as long as the government 
then said it did. . . .  [T]housands of people here are held for 
considerably longer than six months without an 
opportunity to seek bail.  We deal here with prolonged 
detention, not the short-term detention at issue in [Kim]. 
Hence, [Kim], itself a deviation from the history and 
tradition of bail and alien detention, cannot help the 
Government.72 
Consequently, the decision in Kim opened the door to potential 
long-term detention without the opportunity for judicial review 
unless and until the noncitizen can be heard on a habeas petition. 
Moreover, some courts read § 1226(c) and the relevant precedent to 
mean that an individual must first exhaust his administrative 
remedies before he is eligible for habeas consideration, further 
extending detention without recourse.73 
without the opportunity for an individualized bond hearing.  This type 
of detention serves only one purpose; to further penalize criminal 
aliens after their release from criminal custody.  This is not a 
constitutionally permissible reason for subjecting aliens to civil 
detention.  For this cohort of criminal aliens, mandatory detention 
without bond infringes upon the substantive due process protections 
afforded by the Constitution to be free from unreasonable restraint. 
Goring, supra note 58, at 925. 
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1994).
71. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 529 (2003); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). 
72. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 869 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
73. See, e.g., Francisco Cortez v. Nielsen, No. 19-CV-00754-PJH, 2019 WL
1508458, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019) (“[T]he court finds [ ] the prudential 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, and that the petitioner has 
failed to establish any valid exception to the exhaustion requirement.”); 
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  In addition, Judge Wolfson, in Gayle v. Warden Monmouth 
County, recalled that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kim 
suggests that Justice Kennedy understood the Kim majority as 
implicitly holding that “detention under § 1226(c) is nonpunitive 
civil detention, which may be justified . . . at least as long as the 
detention is relatively brief.”74  But, when “a particular case 
result[s] in unnecessarily long detention, that might suggest that 
the detention was meant to be punitive, which could not be so 
justified” without due process.75  Therefore, “were there to be an 
unreasonable delay by [the Attorney General] in pursuing and 
completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then 
to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or 
to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate 
for other reasons.”76 
Finally, scholars and judges offer the critique that if a person 
concedes that he does fall within one of the categories outlined in 
§ 1226(c), he forfeits any possible judicial review until his removal
hearing, or until he can be heard on a habeas petition.  “In the
majority’s view, [the detained person] ha[s] a less weighty liberty
interest than an alien who had not conceded deportability,” thus it
was permissible for him to be held with little, if any recourse.77
Essentially, by conceding deportability, a noncitizen detained
under § 1226(c) “had functionally given himself a final order of
removal” before he received an actual removal order,78 which
contravenes the requirement of due process—the opportunity for an
Jefferally v. Barr, No. H-19-1244, 2019 WL 3935977, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 
20, 2019) (“Jefferally’s challenges have not been administratively exhausted.”). 
74. Portillo v. Hott, 322 F. Supp 3d 698, 706 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2018).
75. Id.; see also Kim, 538 U.S. at 549 (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“[D]ue process under the Fifth Amendment conditions a 
potentially lengthy detention on a hearing and an impartial decisionmaker’s 
finding that detention is necessary to a governmental purpose. . . .  [T]he claim 
of liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment is at its strongest when 
government seeks to detain an individual.”). 
76. Gayle III, No. 12-2806 (FLW), 2019 WL 4165310, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept.
3, 2019) (quoting Kim, 538 U.S. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also 
Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[The detainee] may nonetheless have the right to contest before a neutral 
decision maker whether the government’s purported interest is actually served 
by detention in his case.”). 
77. Bhargava, supra note 18, at 69.
78. Id. at 69–70.
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individual to be heard before having their liberty interests 
violated.79 
Removal proceedings provide a clear procedure to remove a 
person from the United States, and in those proceedings the 
government bears the primary burden.  It is in these removal 
proceedings that a person’s removability is ultimately determined. 
Nevertheless, even if removability is established, lawful permanent 
residents may demonstrate that they are entitled to relief from 
removal.80  All of these factors are considered in removal 
proceedings.  Therefore, at the initial detention phase, “[t]he only 
reason that [the immigrant] is being detained is because the 
government may be able to prove he is subject to removal.”81  
Scholar Shalini Bhargava asked: “how can the central question 
adjudicated in the [removal] hearing—the right of the alien to 
remain in the United States—be answered and given operative 
effect before the hearing even occurs?”82  Such is the function of 
§ 1226(c) as it was drafted and as it has been interpreted.
II. THE JOSEPH HEARING AND THE TWO COMPETING STANDARDS
In 1999, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stated that 
“[t]he regulations generally do not confer jurisdiction on [IJs] over 
custody or bond determinations respecting those aliens subject to 
mandatory detention,” such as those detained under § 1226(c).83  As 
an exception, 8 C.F.R. section 3.19(h)(2)(ii) provides that “the [IJ] 
may make a determination on whether a lawful permanent resident 
‘is not properly included’ in a [§ 1226(c)] mandatory detention 
category . . . either before or after the conclusion of the underlying 
removal case.”84  Consequently, the Joseph hearing was adopted.  
A. The Current Joseph Hearing
Under the Joseph precedent, the Attorney General’s “‘reason to
believe’ that the alien ‘falls within a category barred from release’ 
79. Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 389 (D.N.J. 2015).
80. Id. at 380.
81. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring). 
82. Bhargava, supra note 18, at 71.
83. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 802 (B.I.A. 1999).
84. Id. at 800.
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. . .  can often be expected to suffice until the [IJ] resolves the merits 
of the removal case, a resolution that frequently occurs speedily in 
cases involving detained criminal aliens.”85  If the IJ finds the 
person removable under § 1226(c), “the [IJ] lacks any bond 
jurisdiction;” however, if the IJ finds that the individual should not 
be included in a § 1226(c) category, the IJ “would have [the] 
authority to redetermine custody conditions” under § 1226(a).86 
While in a Joseph hearing, “the detainee may avoid mandatory 
detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not 
convicted of the predicate crime, or that the [Attorney General] is 
otherwise substantially unlikely to establish that he is in fact 
subject to mandatory detention.”87  A Joseph hearing provides the 
detained person “with the opportunity to offer evidence and legal 
authority on the question [of] whether the Service has properly 
included him . . . .”88  In particular, the IJ must be “convinced that 
the [Attorney General] is substantially unlikely to establish at the 
merits hearing . . . the charge or charges that would otherwise 
subject the alien to mandatory detention.”89  The burden of proof is 
placed on the detainee, not the Attorney General, and “[a]s a result 
of the inherently high burden placed on the alien . . . some detainees 
are detained for months or even years without ever having a bond 
hearing.”90 
On the other hand, “the standard of proof on the government is 
less exacting than the one imposed for the merits hearing,” 
maintaining the separation between the standards of proof for the 
actual removal hearing and the preliminary Joseph hearing.91  The 
government need only show a “reason to believe” that the person 
85. Id. at 807 (quoting Procedures for the Detention and Release of
Criminal Aliens by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and for 
Custody Redeterminations by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 63 
Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,444–45 (May 19, 1998)). 
86. Id. at 803, 806.
87. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003).
88. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 805.
89. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
90. Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., No. 12–cv–02806(FLW),
2017 WL 5479701, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2017). 
91. Gayle III, No. 12-2806 (FLW), 2019 WL 4165310, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 3,
2019). 
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falls within an included category,92 a standard the government 
argues is akin to the probable cause standard used in a criminal 
context.93  This standard only adheres to the person’s inclusion 
under § 1226(c) categories and “[f]rom this fact [of inclusion], the 
statute presumes that the alien poses a threat to the community.”94  
This type of hearing is the only mechanism a respondent has in 
combatting mandatory detention,95 unless he is later successful in 
a habeas petition where a federal court requires an IJ to conduct a 
bond hearing and the IJ grants bond. 
B. Two Approaches to the Joseph Hearing
In most cases assessing the adequacy of Joseph hearings, the
courts arrive at the same conclusion—the Joseph hearing does not 
pass procedural due process muster and must be changed.96   Given 
that the Joseph hearing is the only hearing to which a detainee 
under § 1226(c) is entitled, it is essential that the procedures of the 
hearing meet due process standards.  In addressing these very 
issues, two approaches have been proposed to reform the Joseph 
hearing to comply with procedural due process requirements: First, 
in Gayle III, Judge Wolfson proposed that the government bear the 
greater burden and that “it is prudent to impose the probable cause 
standard to protect [the alien’s liberty] interests.”97  Second, in 
Tijani, Judge Tashima, in alignment with Justice Breyer’s dissent 
in Kim, proposed that “only those immigrants who could not raise 
a ‘substantial’ argument against their removability should be 
92. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 802 (citing In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec.
660, 668 (B.I.A. 1999)). 
93. Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *8.
94. Medina, supra note 18, at 725 (emphasis added).
95. Bhargava, supra note 18, at 75 (“This rule places a heavy burden on
the respondent and permits the government to detain individuals who are 
unable to meet this burden. . . .  Without bond hearings or any other 
opportunity to contest detention, an alien who seeks pre-removal release must 
win at her Joseph hearing.”). 
96. See, e.g., Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *19; Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d
1241, 1246–47 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring). 
97. Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *19.
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subject to mandatory detention.”98  Both proposals are described 
below. 
1. The Gayle Approach
In Gayle III, Judge Wolfson determined that “the probable
cause standard is sufficient to ameliorate any potential wrongful 
deprivation of liberty an alien may suffer in light of his or her 
‘substantially unlikely to prevail’ burden at Joseph hearings.”99  
Under the probable cause standard, “an IJ would examine whether 
the facts and circumstances, based upon reasonably trustworthy 
information, are sufficient to warrant a [reasonably] prudent man 
to believe that the alien is subject to mandatory detention under 
§ 1226(c).”100  The burden then shifts to the respondent to show that
the government is “‘substantially unlikely’ to prevail” at the
removal hearing.101
To arrive at the above conclusion, Judge Wolfson applied the 
Mathews v. Eldridge102 standard by conducting a balancing test 
between the competing interests of the government and the person 
detained.103  Mathews provides for the balancing of interests of two 
entities or individuals.  The Mathews standard looks at three 
factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
98. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1246–47 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring)
(quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 578–79) (2003)). 
99. Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *19.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 20.
102. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (establishing a
procedural due process balancing test). 
103. See, e.g., Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *15, *18 (“I find that the
Constitution demands a more exacting or easily definable standard under the 
Mathews test . . . .”); Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 390 (D.N.J. 2015). 
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administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.104 
Judge Wolfson urged that this “flexible” balancing test would yield 
the appropriate result to adequately protect the competing 
interests.105 
In conducting this analysis, Judge Wolfson discussed the first 
and third prong of the Mathews test together.  First, the interest at 
stake for the individual was liberty and not being physically 
restrained by the government.106  Second, Congress sought to 
protect public safety, ensure attendance at removal hearings, and 
correct an allegedly broken bond system.107  Further, Judge 
Wolfson noted the Court “has recognized ‘detention during 
deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the 
deportation process’”108 because the aforementioned interests of the 
government are “compelling,” and thus, do “not . . . run afoul of the 
Constitution.”109  
When Judge Wolfson assessed the third prong, she found that 
the IJs and BIA were inconsistently applying the Joseph standards 
of “reason to believe” and “substantially unlikely.”110  Joseph did 
not clearly outline the government’s “initial burden,” neither did it 
explicate the types of evidence the government must produce to 
meet that amorphous burden.111  Moreover, no case since Joseph 
has specified that the government “bears any sort of formal burden 
at a Joseph hearing.”112  Judge Wolfson observed: 
104. Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *15.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *16.  Through § 1226(c), Congress sought “(1) to protect the
public from potentially dangerous criminal aliens; (2) to prevent aliens from 
absconding during removal procedures; (3) to correct former bond procedures 
under which over twenty percent of criminal aliens absconded before their 
deportation hearings; and (4) to restore public faith in the immigration 
system.”  Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *16. 
108. Id. at *11 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003)).
109. See id. at *15 (citing Kim, 538 U.S. at 518–22)); see also Gayle II, 81 F.
Supp. 3d at 391. 
110. Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *18.
111. See id. at *18–19.
112. Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 394.
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Exacerbating the ill-defined process, the Government 
tacitly concedes that “[t]he burden on the Government 
during a Joseph hearing may change over time and in 
relation to the allegations and evidence presented by the 
alien”; this concession raises the vexing question of how an 
alien is able to prepare his or her argument against 
mandatory detention while navigating a seemingly 
constantly shifting procedural landscape.113 
For all of the listed reasons, Judge Wolfson held that “an individual 
may be deemed subject to mandatory detention even if [the 
Attorney General] merely presented a scintilla of unrefuted 
evidence,” and as a result, there is a serious risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of individual rights that is not “justified” by the 
government’s asserted interests.114  Therefore, Judge Wolfson 
determined that the “Constitution demands a more exacting 
standard under the Mathews test, particularly since the Supreme 
Court has recognized the importance of the protections the Joseph 
hearing is intended to afford.”115  
To support her supposition that requiring the respondent to 
bear the “substantially unlikely” burden meets due process, Judge 
Wolfson stated that the “‘substantially unlikely’ standard . . . 
passes the ‘at-least-some-merit’ review” outlined in Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Kim.116  In combination with the 
probable cause requirement now imposed on the government, 
Judge Wolfson held that the “substantially unlikely” standard has 
been appropriately recalibrated such that a greater balancing 
between the competing interests has been achieved.117 
2. The Tijani Approach
In his Tijani concurrence, Judge Tashima stated that the
Joseph standard is “egregiously” unconstitutional because “[t]he 
113. Id. at 395.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 394.
116. Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *20.  Justice Kennedy stated that “due
process requires individualized procedures to ensure that there is at least some 
merit to [ICE’s] charge, and therefore, sufficient justification to detain a lawful 
permanent alien pending a more formal hearing.”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 
510, 531 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
117. Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *21.
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standard not only places the burden on the defendant to prove that 
he should not be physically detained, it makes that burden all but 
insurmountable.”118  To address this imbalance, Judge Tashima 
held that the government needs to show that the respondent should 
be included in the mandatory detention category by clear and 
convincing evidence.119  If the government meets the clear and 
convincing burden, the burden then shifts to the respondent who 
must “raise a ‘substantial’ argument against [his] removability” 
and is not subject to mandatory detention.120  As Justice Breyer 
stated in Kim, the statute only mandates “the Attorney General to 
‘take into custody any alien who [ ] is deportable,’ not one who may, 
or may not, fall into that category.”121  Thus, the person purporting 
not to be deportable under § 1226(c) only needs to show that his 
claim is “(1) not interposed solely for purposes of delay and (2) raises 
a question of ‘law or fact’ that is not insubstantial.  And that 
interpretation . . . is consistent with what the Constitution 
demands.”122  
As with Judge Wolfson, Judge Tashima reiterated that 
“individual liberty is one of the most fundamental rights protected 
by the Constitution.”123  Additionally, Judge Tashima argued that 
“[t]here can also be no doubt that the Due Process Clause protects 
immigrants as well as citizens.”124  Further, when lengthy civil 
detention is at issue, as it is under § 1226(c), “a system of ‘detention 
by default’” is not permissible and “heightened procedural 
protections to guard against the erroneous deprivation of that 
right” are required.125  
118. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring). 
119. See id. at 1245.
120. Id. at 1246–47.
121. Kim, 538 U.S. at 578 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 578–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1244 (Tashima, J., concurring) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). 
124. Id. at n.2 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)).  “The Fifth
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every [alien] 
from deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” 
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.  
125. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1244 (Tashima, J., concurring).
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To counter the government’s clear and convincing argument, 
the respondent must show that he has a “substantial argument” 
against his removability, and consequently, should not be included 
in the category of individuals who must be detained.126  The 
respondent can “point to inconsistent case law, raise novel but 
plausible legal claims, or demonstrate that [the Attorney General] 
lacks sufficient evidence [to demonstrate that] there is genuine 
uncertainty as to whether the noncitizen ‘is’ removable.”127  For 
example, in Tijani, the respondent claimed that his conviction was 
not an aggravated felony or a crime involving moral turpitude when 
the categorical approach was applied to analyze the state statute 
under which he was convicted against the corresponding federal 
statute.128  Should the state statute be broader than the federal 
statute and divisible, the records of conviction do not support the 
supposition that respondent’s convictions met the standard for 
aggravated felony or crime involving moral turpitude.129  
Employing the “substantial argument” standard, Judge Tashima 
held that the respondent’s arguments “easily rise[ ] to the level of 
‘substantial.’”130  
Judge Tashima argues that the above-outlined standard gives 
effect to “Congress’ chosen language” and the purpose of the 
statute.131  In the Joseph hearing the IJ does not conclude that the 
respondent is definitively not removable; instead, the IJ determines 
whether the respondent may not be removable, and therefore is not 
properly included under a statute that requires certainty.132  
Further, the new standard “provides the government leeway to 
detain those aliens who lack any incentive to press their legal 
claims, and are therefore the most likely to abandon those claims 
and flee.”133  Therefore, Judge Tashima determined that the clear 
and convincing standard, in combination with the “‘substantial 
126. Id. at 1247.
127. Julie Dona, Making Sense of “Substantially Unlikely”: An Empirical
Analysis of the Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody Hearings, 26 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 94 (2011). 
128. See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1247–48 (Tashima, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 1248.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1247.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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argument’ standard” better protects the individual’s liberty interest 
and avoids erroneous deprivation of that liberty, while also giving 
adequate weight to governmental interests.134  
III. WHY THE ADOPTION OF THE “PROBABLE CAUSE” AND “SUBSTANTIAL
ARGUMENT” STANDARD FOR THE JOSEPH HEARING IS ESSENTIAL FOR
DUE PROCESS 
Rodriguez and Preap, along with the myriad of cases that 
grapple with defining aggravated felonies135 and crimes involving 
moral turpitude,136 have changed the mandatory detention 
landscape in which the Joseph hearing is situated.  Rodriguez held 
that the statutory construction of § 1226(c) does not support “some 
arbitrary time limit devised by courts . . . .”137  The statute specifies 
a “definite termination point” of detention in the statutory 
language—“pending a decision on whether the alien is to be 
removed”138—and accordingly, the statute “does not give detained 
aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their 
detention.”139  Further, the statute forecloses judicial review of the 
Attorney General’s decision to include a person within the § 1226(c) 
mandatory detention provision.140  Though the Court left open the 
possibility of as-applied due process challenges to the statute, the 
Court, in dicta, upheld Kim’s holding that § 1226(c) is facially 
constitutional.141 
In close succession to Rodriguez, Preap determined that 
§ 1226(c)’s clause—“when the alien is released”—includes all aliens
who have been held in custody for criminal convictions alleged to
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
136. See, e.g., Vilchiz-Bello v. U.S. Attorney General, 709 Fed. App’x. 596
(11th Cir. 2017); Miranda-Romero v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 524 (8th Cir. 2015); 
Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 
472 (4th Cir. 2012); Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016). 
137. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 846 (2018).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 836.
140. Id. at 841.  Though, the Court clarifies that “§ 1226(e) does not preclude
‘challenges [to] the statutory framework that permits [the alien’s] detention 
without bail.’”  Id. (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003)). 
141. Id. at 846–47; see also Kim, 538 U.S. at 530–31.
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fall within § 1226(c)(1)(A) through (D), regardless of when the crime 
was committed or when the release occurred.142  The Preap Court 
reiterated Congress’ belief that “individualized hearings could not 
be trusted to reveal which deportable aliens who are not detained 
might continue to engage in crime or fail to appear for their removal 
hearings.”143  Therefore, all who could fall under § 1226(c) must be 
detained regardless of when they were released from prison or jail, 
without exception.144 
Finally, § 1226(c) requires the Attorney General to take into 
custody any noncitizen who has been convicted of any number of 
crimes, including, but not limited to: crimes involving moral 
turpitude, controlled substance trafficking, human trafficking, 
prostitution, and aggravated felonies.145  The difficult question of 
what constitutes an aggravated felony or a crime involving moral 
turpitude has only caused greater problems because of the rapidly 
growing and changing bodies of law.146  As highlighted by Judge 
Tashima in Tijani, the respondent in that case had been detained 
for over two years while the IJ, the BIA, and the Ninth Circuit 
grappled with whether Mr. Tijani’s convictions amounted to an 
aggravated felony and/or a crime involving moral turpitude because 
it was such a complex and ever-changing analysis to undertake.147 
In combination, Rodriguez, Preap, and the emerging case law 
that is more clearly defining the crimes encompassed within 
§ 1226(c)(1)(A) through (D) have made the mandatory detention
statute incredibly broad.  Individuals who “have long since paid
their debt to society,”148 have a substantial argument against
removability, and are not dangerous or a flight risk, are highly
142. Nielsen v. Preap, 138 S. Ct. 954, 970 (2019).
143. Id. at 968 (internal citations omitted).
144. Id.
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2018).
146. See generally Tania P. Linares Garcia, Inhale, Exile: Limiting Review
of Aggravated Felonies and Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude After Moncrieffe 
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1673 (2013), 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 573, 573–83 (2015) (overview
of relevant statutes and case law regarding removability of noncitizens on the
grounds of aggravated felonies or crimes involving moral turpitude).
147. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring) (“Today, nearly [thirty] months later, Tijani remains in mandatory 
detention while courts continue to sort out whether his offenses actually fall 
within the reach of the mandatory detention statute.” (emphasis added)). 
148. Nielsen v. Preap, 138 S. Ct. 954, 985 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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likely to be detained, potentially for long periods of time.149  
Further, those who are detained have no statutory right to a bond 
hearing, even if detained longer than six months.150  Further still, 
the discretion of the Attorney General as to who is included in 
§ 1226(c) is not reviewable by the courts.151  All of this is 
compounded by the reality that in many jurisdictions, for any 
habeas petitioner contesting detention to be successful, the 
petitioner must have administratively exhausted their claims, 
unless the petitioner can sustain a sufficient due process challenge 
extending beyond the jurisdiction of the agency.152 
Not only is the Joseph hearing the first opportunity for a 
noncitizen to contest his inclusion in the mandatory detention 
category, it may, in fact, be the sole opportunity a noncitizen has to 
contest his detention for a year’s time or more.  Indeed, the statute 
itself states those who are removable must be detained, and 
therefore, “[o]nly those immigrants who could not raise a 
‘substantial’ argument against their removability should be subject 
to mandatory detention.”153  Because of the “blanket application” 
and the “breadth of its reach,”154 it is clear that the Constitution, 
and, more specifically, due process, requires greater protections for 
noncitizens during the Joseph hearing than is currently provided. 
In Tijani, Judge Tashima averred that, “[t]he B.I.A.’s Joseph 
decision was, plainly put, wrong”155 and constitutes “a decision that 
is both contrary to the Constitution and shortsighted as a matter of 
policy.”156  Furthermore, “the Supreme Court has time and again 
rejected laws that place on the individual the burden of protecting 
149. See id. at 978 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830, 860 (2018). 
150. See Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 836.
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review.  No court 
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section 
regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or 
denial of bond or parole.”). 
152. See supra note 73.
153. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added); see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018). 
154. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1246.
155. Id. at 1244.
156. Id. at 1243.
64  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:40 
his or her fundamental rights.”157  In essence, the Joseph hearing 
“establishes a system of ‘detention by default’” because the 
respondent bears a very high burden of proof in demonstrating that 
he should not be included in the mandatory detention category.158  
Such a burden significantly increases the likelihood that a person 
will be arbitrarily and/or erroneously detained because his 
colorable claim does not persuade the IJ that the Attorney General 
is “substantially unlikely” to win in the subsequent removal 
hearing.159 
As discussed in the prior Part, Judge Tashima in Tijani and 
Judge Wolfson in Gayle III have provided two options as to how to 
change the Joseph hearing.  Ultimately, Judge Tashima and Judge 
Wolfson concluded that the current Joseph hearing does not pass 
due process muster and requires a recalibration of the burdens of 
proof in order to satisfy due process.160  Both judges agreed with 
Justice Souter’s proposition in Kim about the “clear applicability of 
general due process standards: physical detention requires both a 
special justification that outweighs the individual’s constitutionally 
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint and adequate 
procedural protections.”161 Each judge clearly states that 
individual liberty and avoiding physical restraint are foundational 
to the panoply of rights afforded all persons in the United States.162  
Moreover, the judges concur that Congress has “broad power over 
naturalization and immigration that allows it to make rules that 
157. Id. at 1244.
158. Id.
159. See Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp 3d 227, 233–34 (W.D.N.Y.
2019). 
160. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1245 (Tashima, J., concurring) (“[D]ue process
places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings in which 
the individual interests at stake are both particularly important and more 
substantial than mere loss of money.”) (internal citations omitted); Gayle II, 81 
F. Supp. 3d 371, 382 (D.N.J. 2015) (“[E]ven in circumstances where mandatory
detention is constitutionally permissible, due process still requires ‘adequate
procedural protections’ to ensure that the Government’s stated justification for
detaining an alien without a bond hearing ‘outweighs the individually
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’”).
161. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(internal quotations omitted). 
162. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1244 (Tashima, J., concurring); Gayle II, 81 F.
Supp. 3d at 382. 
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would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”163  However, Judge 
Tashima and Judge Wolfson held that the government must bear a 
higher burden of proof when individual liberty and erroneous 
deprivation of that liberty are at risk—and both determined this 
higher burden of proof to be necessary for the Joseph hearing to fall 
within constitutional bounds.164 
A. Probable Cause
The burden of proof the government should be required to meet
in a Joseph hearing is that of probable cause.165  Judge Wolfson 
provided that the “reason to believe” standard as applied in Joseph 
hearings was inconsistently applied across immigration courts.166  
Under Matter of Joseph, it was unclear as to whether the 
government bore any burden in Joseph hearings, and if so, what 
that burden might be.167  Because of these factors, “it is likely that 
an individual may be deemed subject to mandatory detention even 
if ICE merely presented a scintilla of unrefuted evidence.”168  
In practice, the “reason to believe” standard allows the 
government to submit uncertified or unofficial evidence to meet its 
163. Kim, 538 U.S. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80
(1976)); see also Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1247, n.5 (Tashima, J., concurring); Gayle 
II, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 390–91.  However, many of the cases cited to by Justice 
Rehnquist in Kim to support this proposition were cases about access to social 
security or insurance, see Mathews, 426 U.S. at 69–70, the First Amendment 
and the Smith Act, see generally Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 
(1952), or the McCarran Act, see generally Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 
(1952), not directly about detention of an alien who has not yet been 
adjudicated for removability. 
164. See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1244–45 (Tashima, J., concurring); see also
Gayle III, No. 12-2806 (FLW), 2019 WL 4165310, at *17–19 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 
2019).  
165. See discussion supra Section II.B.  Though this author strongly
believes that “clear and convincing” should be the appropriate standard, 
current Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Court would more likely 
uphold a probable cause standard because of its view that noncitizens may be 
subject to lesser due process rights than citizens.  Therefore, this author argues 
a pragmatic approach to bringing Joseph hearings into alignment with due 
process. 
166. Gayle III, 2019 WL 4165310, at *18.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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threshold,169 which “leaves the noncitizen with the burden of 
establishing positive equities in light of a baseline record that may 
already be skewed against her.”170  Such a system has three major 
impacts on evidence collection.  First, this standard improperly 
accounts for the noncitizen’s fundamental right to individual 
liberty, as discussed more fully in prior sections of this Article. 
Second, the “reason to believe” standard disincentivizes the 
government from conducting any kind of an investigation before 
arresting or detaining the person it has “reason to believe” falls into 
the mandatory detention category.171  Third, as Justice Souter 
asserted: 
[D]etention prior to entry of a removal order may ill impede
the alien’s ability to develop and present his case on the
very issue of removability.  After all, our recognition that
the serious penalty of removal must be justified on a
heightened standard of proof, will not mean all that much
when the [Attorney General] can detain, transfer, and
isolate aliens away from their lawyers, witnesses, and
evidence.172
Because the respondent is detained before any kind of Joseph 
hearing is held, the respondent holds a significantly higher burden 
of proof while being physically restrained,  as well as restricted from 
attaining counsel and gathering any evidence to meet that 
burden.173  Therefore, “as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, 
[the current standard] is a serious deprivation of an alien’s liberty 
interest that is not justified by the Government’s interests under 
§ 1226(c).”174
169. Dona, supra note 127, at 76.
170. Das, supra note 18, at 157.
171. Id.; see also Dona, supra note 127, at 75–77.
172. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 554 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. See id.; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 862 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[Bail] not only ‘permits the unhampered preparation 
of a defense,’ but also ‘prevent[s] the infliction of punishment prior to 
conviction.”); Das, supra note 18, at 157–58 (“Detention makes [acquiring 
evidence of positive equities] relatively difficult for the noncitizen.  Detained 
noncitizens have no right to government-appointed counsel.  Detained 
noncitizens may be held in any facility across the United States, and many are 
transferred far from their families and communities.”). 
174. Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 395 (D.N.J. 2015).
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To rectify this issue, Judge Wolfson proffered the probable 
cause standard as the right level of burden to ascertain whether the 
government’s evidence supported the inclusion of this particular 
person in the category of mandatory detention.175  In particular, the 
judge urged that: 
Probable cause requires the kind of fair probability on 
which reasonable and prudent people, not legal 
technicians, act.  While the test is fluid, importantly, and 
contrary to the current reason to believe standard, it 
contains an objective component—the “reasonably prudent 
man” standard—which can adequately be reviewed by 
judges.  By contrast, the “reason to believe” standard, to the 
extent it exists as [the Attorney General]’s burden of proof 
in a Joseph hearing, has no clear objective component.176 
The protection of an objective standard, supported by an abundance 
of precedent, will assist the IJs in applying the probable cause 
standard consistently and fairly.177 
IJs should undertake a review of the “facts and circumstances” 
known to the Attorney General to ascertain “whether a reasonably 
prudent person would believe that the alien had committed the 
offenses triggering mandatory detention.”178  This standard still 
recognizes the differences between the burdens of proof required in 
bond hearings, Joseph hearings, and removal hearings.  To require 
a higher burden of proof than that of probable cause “could obviate 
the purpose of, and the need for, a final removal hearing.”179  
However, to continue allowing a lower burden of proof would enable 
the government to erroneously deprive individuals of their 
rights.180  The probable cause standard is the best compromise to 
protect an alien’s liberty interests while accommodating the 
government’s interests in efficient administration of justice.181  
175. Id. at 395–96 (internal citations omitted).
176. Id. at 396.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Gayle III, No. 12-2806 (FLW), 2019 WL 4165310, at *21 (D.N.J. Sept.
3, 2019). 
180. See id.
181. Id. at 19.
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Such a standard supports the purposes of the statute.182  Moreover, 
probable cause is “the minimum justification necessary” to comply 
with due process while balancing the interests of the government 
and the noncitizen.183 
B. Substantial Argument that Respondent is Not Removable
In Kim, Justice Breyer’s dissent proposed that “only those
immigrants who could not raise a ‘substantial’ argument against 
their removability should be subject to mandatory detention.”184 
Lowering the burden of proof required for the noncitizen is 
important for two key reasons.  First, as Judge Tashima 
determined: 
[T]he Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the
principle that the risk of erroneous deprivation of a
fundamental right may not be placed on the individual.
Rather, when a fundamental right, such as individual
liberty, is at stake, the government must bear the lion’s
share of the burden.185
Second, there is a great deal of fluidity regarding what constitutes 
an “aggravated felony” or a “crime involving moral turpitude,” as 
well as the other crimes included in § 1226(c).186  
Following this in-depth review, Judge Tashima found that the 
“blanket” and “broad” application of the Joseph hearing exacerbates 
an already broad, non-time constrained statute.187  In addition, in 
182. See Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 397–98 (D.N.J. 2015).
183. Id. at 398.
184. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring) (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 578-79 (2003) (Breyer, J. 
dissenting)). 
185. Id. at 1245 (discussing rights such as the right to liberty and the right
to parent). 
186. See Dona, supra 127, at 77 (“The most frequent legal question
addressed in [Joseph hearing] appeals is whether the respondent’s state or 
federal conviction can be classified as an offense enumerated in § [1226](c): a 
crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), an aggravated felony, a controlled 
substances offense, or a firearms offense.”); see also Medina, supra note 18, at 
743; Bhargava, supra note 18, at 54–55; Jorge A. Solis, Detained Without 
Relief, 10 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 357, 383 (2019). 
187. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1246 (Tashima, J., concurring) (noting that
Zadvydas “express[ed] scepticism about detention where the ‘sole procedural 
protections available to the alien are found in administrative proceedings 
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the Joseph context, the respondent’s “detention is not the result of 
a criminal conviction; nor is it because he faces imminent removal 
. . . [he] is being detained because the government may be able to 
prove he is subject to removal.”188  Yet, “[u]nlike [the civil detention 
cases], the Joseph standard places little to no risk on the broad 
shoulders of the government.”189  The “great deal of deference” 
afforded to the Attorney General’s determination,190 in 
combination with the respondent’s burden that is “all but 
insurmountable,” in a hearing where an individual’s liberty is at 
stake makes the Joseph standard “egregiously” unconstitutional.191  
Therefore, an alternative standard must be created and applied. 
To address the first of these issues, Judge Tashima sought 
guidance from Supreme Court jurisprudence on state civil 
detention statutes and federal bail statutes.192  In particular, Judge 
Tashima recalled the Court’s assertion that the “primary function 
of a standard of proof was to allocate the risk of an erroneous 
decision among litigants based upon the competing rights and 
interests involved.”193  When only money is at stake, a lower 
standard may be applied and the parties may bear the risk 
equally.194  In contrast, even when a statute is “narrowly crafted” 
and includes “stringent time limitation[s],” when individual liberty 
is at stake, the government must bear the higher burden.195  Hence, 
Judge Tashima proposed that the noncitizen should only be 
required to assert a substantial argument that he is not properly 
included in the mandatory detention category.196 
where the alien bears the burden.’” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
692 (2001))). 
188. Id. at 1243.
189. Id. at 1246.
190. Id. at 1243.
191. Id. at 1246.
192. See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1245–46 (Tashima J., concurring).  In his review
of civil detention jurisprudence, Judge Tashima cited the following: Addington 
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) and Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).  In
his review of bail procedures, Judge Tashima cited to United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
193. Id. at 1244.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1245–46.
196. Id. at 1244.  Judge Tashima also argued that in addition to the
substantial argument standard for the respondent, the government must first 
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Furthermore, the rapidly shifting body of law that determines 
whether a noncitizen was convicted of crimes that constitute an 
aggravated felony, a crime involving moral turpitude, or an illicit 
trafficking offense is critical to the Joseph hearing.  Should a crime 
no longer be classified as one of those outlined in § 1226(c), the 
noncitizen would not be included in mandatory detention, and 
potentially, would not be removable at all.197  Though “[t]he fluidity 
of the law” in this area “suggests that permanent resident aliens 
facing mandatory detention should pursue aggressive litigation in 
the Joseph hearing,”198 such highly sophisticated and nuanced 
arguments on “unsettled law [are] generally resolved in favor of the 
DHS under the Joseph standard.”199  As noted by Law Professor 
Medina, “[t]he Board rejects novel legal arguments even when it 
explicitly recognizes that they are plausible.”200  As a result, a 
person may suffer detention for a significant period of time as he 
awaits the appellate process regarding his colorable claim of non-
removability because his conviction is not one categorized under 
§ 1226(c).201
Moreover, “the relevant statutes literally say nothing about an 
individual who, armed with a strong argument against 
deportability, might, or might not, fall within their terms.”202  
Therefore, Judge Tashima, in his Tijani concurrence, agreed with 
the four dissenting voices in Kim, and argued that the substantial 
argument standard “is not only more respectful of the Constitution, 
it is also more consistent with Congress’ chosen language[,]” 
prove by a clear and convincing standard that the noncitizen should be 
included in the mandatory detention category.  Id.  He argued that clear and 
convincing is the most consistently applied standard in the civil detention 
context, and the most appropriate for the Joseph hearing.  Id. 
197. See Dona, supra note 127, at 77 (“The most frequent legal question
addressed in [Joseph hearing] appeals is whether the respondent’s state or 
federal conviction can be classified as an offense enumerated in § [1226](c): a 
crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), an aggravated felony, a controlled 
substances offense, or a firearms offense.”); see also Medina, supra note 18, at 
743; see generally Solis, supra note 186. 
198. Medina, supra note 18, at 743.
199. Dona, supra note 127, at 73.
200. Id. at 78.
201. Id. at 77 (“The ambiguous nature of these legal categories is
underscored by the frequent occurrence of circuit splits; what is a deportable 
crime in one circuit may not be one in a neighboring circuit.”). 
202. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 578 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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requiring the Attorney General to detain “any alien who is 
deportable, not one who may, or may not, fall into that category.”203 
The substantial argument standard “give[s] considerable weight to 
any special governmental interest,” while also providing more 
protection for a detained alien’s liberty interest.204  Should there be 
any doubt as to the substantial argument standard, Justice Breyer 
and Judge Tashima offer the reminder—“[this standard] has 
proved workable in practice in the criminal justice system” for 
decades and must be applied when mandatory detention is at 
stake.205 
C. Considering a Substantial Argument for Relief in the Joseph
Hearing
The Joseph hearing only considers where a person is correctly 
included in the category requiring mandatory detention; the 
current scope of the Joseph hearing does not allow a person to raise 
his potential claim for relief from removal.206  A noncitizen who 
conceded that he falls under an included category “did not concede 
that he will ultimately be deported.”207  The person may still have 
a viable claim for relief from removal.  “The failure of the [IJ] in a 
Joseph hearing to consider relief from removal seriously risks the 
erroneous deprivation of an alien’s pre-removal liberty in some 
203. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring). 
204. Kim, 538 U.S. at 578 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205. Id.; Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1247 (Tashima, J., concurring).
206. Kim, 538 U.S. at 556 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘Joseph
hearing’ only permits an alien to show that he does not meet the statutory 
criteria for mandatory detention under § 1226(c).  Kim argues that, even 
assuming that he fits under the statute, the statute’s application to [legal 
permanent residents] like him does not fit under the DPC.”); see also Bhargava, 
supra note 18, at 75 (“Because this hearing is an [legal permanent resident’s] 
only pre-removal opportunity to contest the court’s classification of her record 
into one of the mandatory detention categories, due process requires better 
procedural safeguards and an opportunity for an [IJ] to consider possible relief 
from removal.”); Goring, supra note 58, at 923 (“The parameters of a Joseph 
hearing are not broad enough to include an evaluation of removability.”  Even 
if they were, they “would not have prevented immigration officials from 
subjecting him to mandatory detention without an individualized bond 
hearing.”). 
207. Goring, supra note 58, at 923.
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cases.”208  With such a narrow scope and high burden of proof 
placed on the respondent, Joseph hearings “do little to ensure that 
the agency is making optimal decisions regarding the proper 
application of the mandatory detention statute.”209  Considering 
relief may optimize decision-making and alleviate over-inclusion in 
mandatory detention. 
CONCLUSION 
As Judge Wolfson declared, “whenever an individual’s liberty 
is at stake, any protections to avoid errors should be considered and 
encouraged.”210  Therefore, “[b]ecause mandatory detention in the 
immigration context deprives aliens of their liberty interests, it is 
prudent to impose the probable cause standard to protect those 
interests.”211  Provided the government has met its burden, and to 
ensure that the burden is appropriate given the “magnitude” of the 
liberty interest at stake, the burden on the respondent should be 
that he presents a substantial argument against his inclusion in 
the mandatory detention category or for his claim for relief from 
removal.  As long as § 1226(c) is in place and mandatory detention 
is allowed, due process requires that the government bear the 
greater burden in demonstrating the inclusion of the noncitizen in 
a § 1226(c) category, while the noncitizen bears the lighter burden. 
Anything less erodes the foundation of the very freedoms on which 
this country was built. 
208. Bhargava, supra note 18, at 89.
209. Das, supra note 18, at 155 n.82.
210. Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 402 (D.N.J. 2015).
211. Id. at 395–96.
